Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1951

Marcella Jensen Tuttle and Richard Dale Tuttle v.
Pacific Intermountain Express and Heath H.
Cornette : Reply Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Stewart, Cannon & Hanson; E. F. Baldwin, Jr.; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express, No. 7619 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1381

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARCELLA JENSEN TUTTLE
and RICHARD DALE TUTTLE,
a minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem,
Marcella Jensen Tuttle,
Pla.i ntiffs and Respondents,

Case No.
vs.

7619

PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXPRESS, a corporation, and
HEATH H. CORNETTE,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

F I J~~
t.

-,

.t-\:r__-; ~
----·~--c·,- ~- -;· - -::~-

~

2-~-~, STEWART,
xC~'
CANNON & HANSON,
, __ __

,~ l:J~!

E. F. BALDWIN, JR.

---_----- r-:---- ~-"· ·.~ ~~-- : . ,-~ -1lltorneys for Defendants
!.._, .. :•..~ and Appellants.

·...tenc \ ,:,upt e me 'L,01~:l'

'1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUBJECT INDEX
I.

Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------------- 1
Suppositions do not Dispel Proven Facts ........................... . 2
No Northbound Car was Involved in the Accident ___________ _ 4
Plaintiffs' Map, Exhibits "FF" and "GG"------------------------3, 4
Witnesses' Testimony is no Stronger Than Qualified
or Limited on Cross-Examination__________________________________ 7
Negative Character of Plaintiffs' Evidence and Remoteness from the Scene of Accident____________________________
Elmer M. Roberts _______________________ -----------------------------__
Douglas A. Payne ___________________ -----------------------------------

7
8
8

Dellis Elliott -------------------------------------- ____ ------------------ 9
Gordon Elliott ---------------------------------------- ______________ 9, 10
Hearsay Should be Disregarded as Incomt>etent Evidence ----------- ___ . ___________ . ____ -----·---.- ________ . ___ ------------ ___ ....... ___ 12
Dispute as to Beardall Car---------------------------------------------------Physical Facts ----------.---------------------------- ------------·--·- _--------·-···
Respondents' Authorities --------·····--------------------------------------Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict Should
have been Sustained--------··-·····--················-····--········--·-···
II.

13
17
23
25

ERRONEOUS AND MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS ····---····- .26
Jury Did not Determine Tuttle Car was Travelling North
Defendants' Theory of the Evidence was Denied................
Procedure of Plaintiff was Calculated to Prejudice .... 32,
Palpable Error in the Court's Instructions Requested
by Plain tiff Were Calculated to Prejudice....................
The Court's Instruction No. 15--------------------35, 36,
The Court's Instruction No. 14-----------------·····--·------The Court's Instruction No. 13----------------------------····
No. 1, Submitting all Unsupported Allegations ......

28
30
33
35
37
37
38
39

Lights Were Not a Proximate Cause.·----------------------·····-····-· 40
Undue Emphasis on Presumptions and Inferences ........ 40, 41
Insurance Indemnification ------------------------------------------·······- 4 2
III.

CONCLUSION ···-····-···--·-··-··-·······---·····---·······-·-·--·····-·····--·------- 43

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:

Page

Anderson v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 76 Utah 324, 289 p 146 ________ 26
Boutelle v. White (Ga.), 149 S.E. 8 0 5----------------------·--------------------Cederlof v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P(2) 777·---------------·----------Clark v. Los Angeles and S.L.R. Co., 73 Utah 486, 275 P 582 ____
Coray v. Ogden Union Ry. and Depot Co., 111 Utah 541 180
p ( 2) 54 2 ------------------------··----····--·------------------------------:____________
Dudley v. Surles (La.), 11 So. 2nd 7 0 ---------------------------- 7 ~-------------East Grouse Creek Water Co. v. Frost, 66 Utah 587, 245 P 338 ..
Edwards v. Clark, et al, 96 Utah 121, 83 P(2) 1021..__________________

36
27
33
25
27
26
7

Fry v. Smith (Iowa) 2 53 N. W. 14 7------------------------------------------------ 3 6
Gagos v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 101, 48 P(2) 449 ________ 25
Giles v. Voiles (Ga.), 88 S.E. 201---------------------------··----------------------- 36
Grandhagen v. Grandhagen (Wis.), 255 N.W. 935------------------------ 37
Gregory v. Suhr (Iowa), 268 N.W. 14-------------------------------------------Hearstrich v. Oregon Short Lines R. R. Co., 70 Utah 552,
2 6 2 p 1 0 0-----------------------------------------------··-· -------. -·- --·-·------------ --In Re Newells Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P(2) 230---------------------------Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 522, 88 P(2) 459·------·-----------------Jensen v. Utah Ry. Company, 72 Utah 366, 270 P 349 ________________

36

25
32

Knutson v. Luri (Iowa), 251 N.W. 147 -------------·----·--------------------Leavitt v. Thurston, 38 Utah 351, 113 P 77---------------------------------Lither bury v. Kimmet (Cal), 19 5 P 6 6 0---------------------------------------Loony v. Parker (Iowa), 230 N.W. 570-----------------------------------------Madron v. McCoy, et al (Idaho) 126 P(2) 566---------------------------Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P(2) 127 .... --------------------

35
25
27
36
27
38

25
41

Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P(2) 772---------------------------- 31
Perrin v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 P 405 ____________ 24, 41
Porter v. Hunter, 60 Utah 222, 207 P 153 ... --------------------------------- 7
Probst v. Smith Hardware Co. (La.), 141 So. 508------------------------ 27
Putnam v. Industrial Commission, et al, 80 Utah 187, 14
p ( 2) 9 7 3 -------------------------"·------------------------------------------------------ 7
Saltas v. Affleck, 9 9 Utah 3 81, 10 5 P ( 2) 17 6 .................... 3 7, 3 8, 41
Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 2 6 2, 17 0 P 7 2---------------------------------------- 38
State v. Green, 7 8 Utah 58 0, 6 P ( 2) 17 7 --------------------------------·------- 3 8
Verrill v. Harrington (Me.), 16 3 Atl. 2 6 6-------------------------------------- 27
Young v. Cerrato (Cal.), 3 7 P ( 2) 10 6 3~--------------------------------------- 2 7
STATUTE -

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, SECTIONS: "

57-7-113 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARCELL.._c\_ JENSEN TUTTLE
and RICHARD DALE TUTTLE,
a minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem,
Marcella Jensen Tuttle,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No.
vs.

7619

PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXPRESS, a corporation, and
HEATH H. CORNETTE,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

I

RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
When there are eye-witnesses to an accident, including disinterested witnesses who actually saw how the
accident occurred, there is no reason to guess or assume
that one of the vehicles (in this instance the Tuttle
car) was going in the opposite direction to which it
was actually travelling at the very time of the accident.
There is no question in this case·but what the McPhies,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

being close to the scene of the accident and W'alking in
the same direction as the Tuttle car was travelling,
saw how it occurred. Their testimony is corroborated
by the physical facts and other witnesses, namely,
Stevenson, Cornette, and we might add Carol Ellis as
evidenced on her cross examination.
Much of what we could say here is set forth in our
original brief, including specific excerpts from the evidence. Counsel for respondents has, however, indulged
in numerous statements and conclusions which appear
more calculated to confuse and distort the actual facts
than enlighten the court. Much is directed to sympathy
and collateral matters.
It is without dispute, and counsel for respondents
agrees, that ALL WITNESSES WHO ACTUALLY
SAW AND WITNESSED THE COLLISION (and
they were in the immediate vicinity) testified that the
Tuttle car, travelling near the west edge of the highway, suddenly turned as though making a U turn immediately in front of defendants' truck. That was the
actual cause of the collision.
NOTIONS AND SUPPOSITIONS OF COUNSEL
D~O NOT DISPEL THESE VISIBLE FACTS. Such
would be to accept speculation as against the clear and
undisputed testimony of ALL WITNESSES who actually saw the accident occur. THERE IS NO REASON
TO SPECULATE WHEN DISINTERESTED WITNESSES OBSERVED WHAT HAPPENED·. ACTUAL PROBATIVE FACTS SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM SPECULATION AND BARE HYPOTHESES.
2
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'Y"ithout unnecessarily duplicating the matter
stated in our original brief, but to illustrate the farfetched notions and suppositions of counsel, we would
like to call attention to the location of the various witnesses 'Yi th relation to the place of the actual collision,
and the various distances involved. It is frequently helpful in nsualizing general locations to refer to the maps
and drawings.
In our original brief, we inserted a photostatic copy
of the large map, plaintiffs' Exhibition "GG". Perhaps
here "~e should make the observation that in order to
get the· exhibit in the brief, it is of necessity smaller
than the original, about one-fourth in size. It also appears the photographer was unable to get in the extreme
ends of the map. So, in measuring and calculating actual distances, such measurement should be taken from
the original, unless the substantially reduced size is
taken into account.
The full details of Exhibit '' FF' ', the small~r rnap,
although substantially duplicated on the top of Exhibit "GG", prepared by plaintiff, was drawn to a
very small ~cale ; one inch equals 100 feet. Being 41
inches in length, it represents the total distance along
the actual highway of 4100 feet, practically a mile
(5,280 feet). The scale is so small that .the actual four
paved traffic lanes are not shown, the two outside lines
being an inch in width, representing the entire right
of way to the fence lines, or 100 feet in actual width on
the ground. ( T. 13)
It should further be observed as to Exhibit "FF"
3
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that there is a small oblong area in the approximate
center of the map indicated by heavy dotted lines and
which measures on the exhibit 4x2 inches. It is within
this small area that the collision occurred. Such area
is shown in greater detail on the larger map shown on
the bottom of Exhibit '' GG' ', the paved lanes of traffic
being there shown. The larger map is drawn to the
scale of one inch equals six feet, nearly 17 times larger
than the small map; the large one represents an over-all
distance of 400 or 410 feet on the actual highway or
ground. This larger scaled map is simply an enlargement of the small 4x2 inches area indicated on the
small map '(Exhibit "FF"), and the McPhie residence
is located within such area. (See plaintiffs' original
Exhibit '' FF '') The brass monument shown on Exhibit
'' FF'' is not the brass monument where the collision
occurred. There was another brass monument near the
collision, shown only on the enlarged map (bottom of
Exhibit "GG").
NO NORTHBOUND CAR \VAS INVOLVED IN
THE ACCID·ENT
When one considers the extreme ends to which
counsel went in his efforts to prove that the Tuttle
car was travelling north, the use of such a small scaled
map, Exhibit "FF ", is self-evident. Respondents'
claims are based solely upon the notion advanced that
the Tuttle car was going north. YET NO ONE SAW
A N~ORTHBOUND CAR AT OR NEAR THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE COLLISION NOR ANY
SUCH CAR ACTUALLY INVOLVED IN THE COL-

4
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LISIOX. Respondents' suppositions are based upon
the isolated statement of one witness, namely Ernest
L. Holt, that he sa\Y HEADLIGHTS of a northbound
Yehicle ABOUT THE CENTER OF THE COUNTY
I~FIR~LA.RY HILL. Holt was riding in a car with
Clifford Beardall, a close friend of deceased and deceased's family ...A.s to his actual observations, we quote
his testimony :
'' Q. I see. N O"\V were there any cars, or did
you notice any cars southward, or northward
bound to,vard Provo~

''A. There was one car coming towards
Provo.

"Q. Where was that~ A. It was - oh, I'd
say about halfway down the Infirmary Hill.

"Q. And do you know, when you made that
observation whether it was before or after the
truck passed~
A. Before the truck passed.''
(T-136)
With respect to when the truck passed, he testified
on cross-examination :

''Q. I think you told us that this truck passed
you just a little south of Lou's Place~ A. I
said in the vicinity of Lou's Place.
'' Q. Well, I think you did. Were you north
or south of Lou's Place. A. I WOULDN'T BE
SURE." (T-140)
And, indeed, he wasn't and couldn't be sure.
Referring back to the map, plaintiffs' Exhibit
"FF" (or see the upper portion of plaintiffs' Exhibit
"GG") and measuring the scale, we observe it is 1162
'5
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feet from Lou's Place to the approximate point of collision and another 18 or 19 inches on the map, or 1800
to 1900 feet, to the approximate middle of the Infirmary
'Hill. Totalling these distances, there was not less than
2900 to 3000 feet (over one-half mile) that even the
headlights of any northbound car was claimed to have
been seen or observed. With many· cars on the welltravelled highway at night, it is only likely, (perhaps
more likely than not), that someone within nearly a
mile 's· distance would claim to have· seen northbound
lights of some vehicle at some remote point. Being at
night, it .couldn't really be known (if lights were seen
and no other witness saw any) whether it was the Tuttle
vehicle or even if it was a passenger car. Certainly,
it seems the height of speculation to assume that such
car was involved in the accident when there is no evidence that this or :any northbound car was in the vicinity
of the collision. MR. HOLT DID NOT SEE THE
LIGHTS THEREAFTER, and it is just as likely that
the lights observed belonged to the automobile that was
seen by Mrs. McPhie after the . accident which came
from th·e south towards the north and stopped just south
of defendants' truck. (T-332, 337) She said, "It was
stopping at that time, :about the time that we arrived
there, the car from the south driving north''. (T-337)
We might add another observation concerning actual distances. Holt did not know how far north of
Lou's Place he was when he claimed to have seen the
headlights on the Infirmary Hill. The truck would
necessarily have had to have passed him, Holt, a sub1
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stantial distanee north of Lou '8 or, otherwise, such
headlights "\Yould haYe had to haYe travelled substantially in exces~ of 50 m.p.h. to have met the truck at
the ~IcPhie 's residenee, the place of collision.
It is a 'Yell established la'v that a WITNESS'
TESTI~IONY ON DIRECT EXAJ\1INATION IS NIO
STROXGER TH.A_X _A_S nlODIFIED 0R LIMITED
BY HIS FURTI-IER EX.A_niiNATION OR BY HIS
CROSS EX ...\~IIXATION.
Porter v. Hunter, 60 Utah 222, 207 P 153.

Edwards v. Cla.rk, et al, 96 Utah 121, 83
P(2) 1021.
Putnanz v. Industrial Commission, et al, 80
Utah 187, 14 P(2) 973.
While ''""e may be necessarily repeating some of our
summary of the evidence given in our original brief,
\Ye wish to further point out the remote and speculative nature of the conclusions of counsel for respondents vievved in the light of this well-established rule.
The negative character of the testimony of the witnesses Charles M. Roberts, Douglas A. Payne, Jean
Elliott and Dellis and Gordon Elliott, her two boys,
was brought out at page 34 of our original brief. In
view of counsel's insistance, however, we would like to
quote further from the actual re~ord. Counsel for respondents, through these friendly witnesses and leading and suggestive questions, elicited general statements,
estimates if the court please, to the effect that the truck
as it passed was travelling approximately 50 m.p.h.,
and in passing, may have passed approximately near
,...

'
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eenter of the highway. THEY ALL ADMITTED
TilEY DID NOrr SEE THE COLLISION AND ALL
OF THEM WERE SUBSTANTIALLY OVER ONEFOURTI-I OF A MILE OR MORE FROM THE
SCENE.

tltP

Perhap~ it should he mentioned that the Charles

M. Roberts here was not the Elmer M. Roberts walking with the McPhjc~s near the accident. He was travelling in a ear about 20 rn.p.h. (T-26) three-fourths of
a mile north of the accident. ( T -25) He did not see the
accident a no I a ter. a~ to 'vhen he arrived at the scene,
l1e ~Hi(]. · · \\'h.--.n T >;"'•1 ~~ut tlJPI'P tllP tundit.ion wa:-: tht=>rt>:
TH~~T·~ AI.!. -1 K~U\V ABOliT TFLA_T'~. (T-26)

Douglas A Payne -vvas delivering papers for the
Deseret News about a block and a half north of Lou's
Place (or approximately three Salt Lake City blocks
from the scene of the collision). No claim was made
that he saw the accident. We quote:

"Q. How long did you observe that truck~
The P.I.E. outfit. A. I couldn't see it after it
got up the road about a block and a half or two
blocks. I DIDN'T SEE IT AFTER THAT."
(T-35)

The Elliotts lived on the west side of the highway
about 1700 or 1800 feet north of the accident. The two
boys were on their \\lay to Springville and had gotten
out on the west edge of the highway. Their mother,
Jean Elliott, was produced by plaintiff as a witness.
She had been concerned about the boys and came out on
her front porth and saw the truck pass. She did not

8
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rlain1 to haYe seen the accident. ( T -53-55)
As to the t\YO Elliott boys, Dellis explained that
they \Yere bet,Yeen their home and the Petrofesa 's residence. This \\"as over 1500 feet, or subst:antially over
one-fourth of a mile, fron1 the place of accident. (An
X and the initials G.E. \Yere placed on the upper part
of Exhibit "GG" to illustrate their general location).
Dellis testified they 'vere going to Springville to attend
a dance. He observed the truck passed, and testified
further:
'' Q. How many cars had gone past going south ":bile you were there~ A. Going south?
'' Q. Yes. Going toward Springville. A.
Well, I dont know.
"Q. Would you have any estimate~ A.
Why, I wasn't counting the cars. We was looking for a ride. But in ten minutes how many
cars can go by on a main highway 1
'' Q. I'm just asking you. A. I don't know.
(T-50)
"Q. Did you observe the truck after it
passed you? A. UNTIL IT GOT TO ABOUT
LOU'S. THAT'S ALL." (T-45)
While counsel for respondents through leading and
suggestive questions attempted to elicit from Gordon
Elliott, the other boy, that he observed no cars ahead
of the one the truck was passing, it is evident that this
immature boy did not know with any degree of certainty
what cars were southbound ahead of the truck :and had
no actual knowledge as to the cause of the accident.
He said, "Well, we were hitchhiking over to Springville,

9
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we vvas going· to a BASKETBALL GAME, and this
truck passed me. I turned my back to it to keep the
wind and snow out of my face, ~and it went up the road
and I heard a crash, a big flash of lightning and crashing, and me and my brother went up there." (T-57)
By the next question and in :an effort to lead this
immature witness, the following question and answer
are significant :
' ' Q. When it passed you was there any other
car in the vicinity? A. It was passing a car.
'' Q. . You say you turned away from the
snow, as I understand. Which way did you turn?
A. Sou.th .. '' ( T -57)
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION, HOWEVER, HE
ACKNOWLEDGED TI-IAT BECAUSE OF TIIE
. WIND AND SNOW FROM THE TRUCK, HE
TURNED ~IS BACK TO THE TRUCK AS IT PROCEEDED SOUTH. WE QUOTE:
'' Q. You say, Gordon, when this truck went
past you it caused a lot of wind . and snow to
come whirling at you?
A. Quite a bit.
'' Q. And you sort of ducked your head to
avoid that, did you? A. I turned my back to it.
'' Q. YOU TURNED ·youR BACK TO IT,
AND THE TRUCK PROCEEDED ON SOUTH
(T-59); IS THAT RIGHT~ A. YES. (T-60)

''Q. At the time you observed it, had the
truck started to pass one or two cars~ A. ONE,
AS I CAN REMEMBER." (T-60)
As to the accident he testified :
'' Q. Did you or did you not see the other

10
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car \Yith \Yhirh the rar collided before the aceident occurred J? A. No, I didn't see it.
~ · Q.

And you didn't see the accident, or the
actual iinpact between the truck and the car,
did you 1 A. No." (T-66)
That Gordon had no actual kno"Tledge of the cause
of the accident is further self -evident from his staternent admitted in eYidence and which was taken the day
immediately following the accident, January 16, 1949,
at a time \Yhen admittedly the matter was clearer in
his mind than at the time of trial. (T-72) This statement was taken in the presence of his father, Earl E.
Elliott, and \Yas countersigned by the father, who
vouched for the fact that the statement contained his
sons version of the accident. It read:
''Provo, Utah. January 16, 1949. My name is
Gordon Elliott. I am thirteen years of age. I
live With my folks on Highway 91 in the south
end of Provo, Utah. On January 15, 1949, it was
shortly before nine at night, it was dark, I was
out in front of our home. I was out alongside
the highway. A large truck went by while I was
out on the highway. I watched the truck go south.
It was in the center lane. It was passing some
other cars. It had sounded its horn as it was
passing these other cars. After the car got some
distance south of our place I heard a. bang and
I could see the truck was skiding. I did not see
the other car until after I went up to the accident. I don't know just how the· accident occurred. I .don't know which way this other car
was traveling. I vvas the only one in my family
that saw the truck. The rest of my folks were
in the house. I have read the statement and it is
11
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correct." Signed "Gordon Elliott". And underneath, "The above is my son's version of the
accident." Signed "Earl E. Elliott". (See Exhibit "1" Prime) (T-77, 78)
When the rule is applied, namely that a witness'
testimony on direct examination is no stronger than as
modified or limited by his further or cross ex~amination,
the negative testimony of the foregoing witness, as well
as that of Beardall, Holt and Carol Ellis, is insufficient
to establish any facts in proof that the Tuttle car was
travelling NORTH, or to establish or prove the accident occurred in any other manner than as proven by
the eye witnesses.
HEARSAY N,OT COMPETENT EVIDENCE
Counsel for respondent, page 8 of his brief, says
"Mrs. Ellis testified that she first thought that the
car that had been following was the car involved in the
accident (Tr. 90), but changed her mind when she talked
to Mr. Stevenson. (Tr. 107)" The only reason given by
this witness was, therefore, based upon HEARSAY.
Testimony, having as its SOLE BASIS hearsay is
not probative evidence and when that element is eliminated from Miss Ellis' testimony AS IT SHOULD BE,
her testimony being no stronger than shown on cross
examination, in very fact corroborates the other eye
witnesses. She clearly testified how the truck passed
the car she was riding in with Stevenson immediately
before the accident; that they were following another
passenger car immediately ahead; that she had observed
the tail lights of the passenger car immediately ahead;

12
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did not obserYe the impart but observed that the tail
lights diS'a.ppeared immediately following the impact.
She sa'Y no north bound cars in the immediate vicinity
"·hatsoever. She "·as a'Yare of the fact that there were
some pedestrians by the iinmediate side of the road
(the ~IrPhies and Mr. Roberts). Referring to the time
of the accident, she '""as asked and she answered the
following questions:
"Q. I see. And at that time you were under
the assmnption that the car you were following
had been involved in this accident with the truck,
were you not~ A. That's right.

''Q. And that was based upon the impression you received there that night~ A. That's
correct." (T-96)
Her statement given two days following the accident
when she acknowledges ''the facts were fresh'' in her
mind (T-99-100) further evidenced what she saw when
the accident occurred. See p·ages 24-30 our original
brief.
DISPUTE AS TO BEARDALL CAR
When it is considered that the electric wires did not
come down instantly at the time of the collision and
that the Stevenson-Ellis car parked on the west or right
hand side of the road whereas Beardall, as he came up,
arrived after the wires were down and went to the east
side of the road where he flashed his lights on the
wreck and immediately became engaged in the activities
which he described, it is understandable that some dispute might arise as to vvhich of the two cars, the Stev-
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enson's or Beardall's actually arrived first.
Referring to the wires, Carol Ellis testified:
''Mr. Stevenson was undecided as to whether
to try to go underneath them or to back up, and
we stopped. AND FINALLY LIGHTS WENT
OUT AND WIRES CAME DOWN, and he was
gone a few moments and came back and decided
to move his car out of the highway so he pulled
over into the snow bank and left me, :and I stayed
in the car.''

''Q. Which snow bank was

that~

A. On
the right side of the road. * * * Well, there were
people .over by the ca.r and standing around.''
Beardall did not, on the other hand, arrive until the
wires were .down a few seconds after he heard the impact. After. he brought his car to a stop, he immediately
pulled directly over to the east side of the highway, casting his lights. on the two vehicles and immediately engaged himself at the scene of the wreck. He testified:
. _ ''A. Well, as the truck passed me it was only
a few seconds or some time until we heard a collision, terrific impact and a light flash from the
at the light up there.", and I said, "Yes, Look at
the car across the road.'', and as I glanced at the
car he said, ''Stop the car. The wires are in
front of you.'', and as I pulled my car to a stop
the wires was about eight inches from my car.
_ "Q. All right. Was there any car at all in
front of you~ A. I never seen a car in front
of me, no sir. (T-113)
'' Q. And what did you do then, Mr.· Beardall~
A. I IMMEDIATELY OPENED ~11
LEFT-HAND DOOR AND LOOKED AROUND
TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANY TRAFFIC
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FOLLOWING ME, AND TURNED MY CAR
IN _..-\_ DIAGONAL POSITION ACROSS THE
HIGHW.~A.Y AND ONTO THE EAST SIDE OF
THE R~O.A.D AND PULLED MY LIGHTS UP
UNTIL THEY HIT THE SCENE OF THE
ACCIDENT.
~ 'Q. vVhen you say you pulled your car to
the east side of the road, how did you make that
operation~ A. I turned my wheels to the right,
this \Yay, (Indicating) and made a diagonal turn
across the highway.
'' Q. And how long after you came up to the
wires did you do that, Mr. Beardall ~ A. Immediately.
"Q. Immediately~ A. Yes, sir.
''Q. Then what did you do~ A. Then weI got out of the car and opened the trunk and
took a large spotlight out of the car which I had in
the car. (T-114)
''Q. At that time was there anyone ;at the
scene of the accident~ A. There was no one
at the scene when I arrived there THAT I NOTICED." (T-115)
At pages 32-33 of our original hrief, we quoted from
the record, showing that neither Beardall nor Holt saw
the accident. and their first intimation of the accident
was when they saw the flashing of the wires. It is evident from the record just quoted above that in stopping,
l\1r. Beardall IMMEDIATELY concerned himself with
turning his car diagonally -across the highway and over
to the scene of the wreckage on the east side. Under
such circumstances, it is easy to see a possibility which
prompted counsel for the respondents to raise an issue
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as to which car, Beardall's or Stevenson's, arTived at
the scene of the accident first. However, a dispute as
to that mater could not constitute any affirmative evidence showing how the accident in fact occurred, and
the fact that respondents rely entirely upon negative
testimony is indicative that plaintiffs' entire case was
based upon pure supposition. None 'of the witnesses
whose testimony he relies upon saw the accident. They
could not consistant with their oath testify contrary to
the testimony of the disinterested eye witnesses and
established physical facts.
The McPhies had no possible interest in the case.
They were standing right by where the accident oc~ured. Their testimony is corroborated by the physical
facts, by the further sworn testimony of defendants'
driver, Stevenson and by Carol Ellis as shown on cross
examination. When there are disinterested eye witnesess, there is no reason to assume the accident oCcurred in some other manner found upon supposition
and speculation.

~- ....
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PI-IYSICAL FACTS
The physical facts and eye-witnesses show that the
impact and collision ·occurred on the west side of the
highway in the lane of traffic next to the center line.
True, the exact center of the high,vay could not be known
by any of the eye-,vitnesses because the two center lanes
were covered 'vith packed sno,v, as shown in defendants'
Exhibit 7 reproduced herein. A careful reading of the
testimony of all eye-'vitnesses, even those of respondent ("~ho '\vere not eye-w,.itnesses to the collision) and
who "~ere 'vithin a quarter of a mile of the scene of the
accident, shows that the truck was on the west side of
the ·center of the highway and that the left wheels,
while close to the center, did not vary much over a foot
either way.
In referring to the truck at the time of the impact
Mrs. McPhie said, ''There is to (two) lanes on the west
side of the road. He was on tl].e east one of those two.''
(T-343)

Mr. McPhie testified :
"Q. Mr. McPhie, at the time of the impact
do you know whether the truck was on the east
side of the road or the center line or on the west
side~ A. It was on the west side." (T-373-374)
Even Beardall and Holt at a point substantially
north of the accident were unable to say that the truck
got any substantial distance over the center line. Beardall testified:
"Q. Did you observe the position of the
truck on the highway~ A. Yes, very much.
That night on the road was the traveled portion
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of the highway in near the center line - lane
of the lefthand side of traffic, and we were traveling where it was most worn, because that was
the part of the highway not as slick as the rest
of the road, and of course when the truck passed
me it would have to be over the center lane, in
double lane traffic.'' ( T-112)
While counsel for respondent attempted by leading
and suggestive questions to elicit from Holt that the
truck went onto the east side (T. 136-7), it was clear
on cross-examination that even when the truck passed
the Beardall car the left wheels were not far over the
center. Mr. Holt testified:

'' Q. And which lane was the truck traveling
in when it passed you~ A. Center lane, with
the left wheels across the highway. Across the
center line, I should say.
'' Q. How far would you say those left
wheels were across the center~ A. At least a
foot at the time they passed us.
'' Q. The center of the highway was covered
with snow~ A. That's right." (T-141)
It was also clear that Holt did not know either the
position of defendants' truck or the Tuttle car when
the collision occurred. We quote :
"Q. Then I take it, Mr. Holt, that you, from
your observation there that night, could not state
what the position of the truck or the Tuttle car
was when the impact occurred~ A. Not at the
time of the impact, no. Just prior to that I mentioned where the truck was. '' ( T -141)
Officer Halladay of the Provo City police, who was
called to the scene of the accident, identified fresh visible
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scratch marks covering the highway from west to east.
To illustrate the location he wrote the word "scratches"
crossing the center line of the highway ( T -226, 227, 228),
written in pencil on Exhibit "GG". While the word
"scratches'' is only faintly shown on our photostat
following page 6 of our original brief, it is more clearly
shown on the original exhibit. Referring to these marks
Officer Halladay said:
''They were visible to the naked eye. I could
see them very plain. ·Of course it was p·retty
lighted around there at that time, but I could
see them all right. They looked like something
had drug along the top· of the ice there.''
'' Q. Could you tell us whether the marks
had the appearance of being fresh or old marks~
A. They were fresh. You could tell from the
way the ice was kicked up there. '' ( T -228)
There was no evidence, either physical or otherwise,
that the collision occurred on the east side of the highway. The sole- and only argument of respondents is
based upon the claim that the Tuttle car would not have
stopped at a point on the east shoulder north of the
defendants' truck and trailer if the Tuttle car was
travelling south as the eye-witnesses described.

v -·

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We have inserted here,vith a photostatic copy of
defendants' Exhibit 3, 4 and 9 'vhich show the damaged
condition of the Tuttle ear caused by the impact of the
truck. It is rlear that the front of the truck struck the
left side of the Plymouth practically broadside. As all
of the eye-,vitnesses described, the truck, following the
impact, jack-knifed, sliding over onto and along the
east shoulder. ''Thile expert witnesses were not used
by either party to determine the possible course or position in 'Yhich the vehicles \Yould be likely to come to rest
under such circumstances, logic and reason certainly
tend to corroborate those vvho saw the ·accident occur.
The Plymouth under such circumstance~ could tend to
take three possible courses. If it were stationary upon
the highway and ·struck exactly in the center with the
weight evenly distributed, it might tend to be pushed
continuously in front of the truck lmtil it came to rest.
Dependent upon other and varied circumstances, it
might be thrown or sloughed off to the side in either direction, east or west, prior to the time the truck stopped.
With the heavy p-art of the Plymouth being lodged in
the front end carrying the _engine, and with its moveInent or direction of travel being towards the east, it is
only logic to believe it would skid or slide off in that
direction, that is easterly or.. rather southeasterly, by
reason of the force of the impact. The truck, on the
other hand, having a greater speed and momentun1 would
naturally tend to travel a substantial distance further.
In negotiating a turn across the highway, the physical facts show that the Plymouth at the time it was.
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struck was substantially across defendants' lane of traffic. The first point of impact would be toward the rear
end of the Plymouth' unless it, the Plymouth, could have
reached a position directly diagonal and at right ·angles
with the highway. This initial impact being toward
the rear of the Tuttle car would tend to turn it and
slide it off.
TIME OF ACCIDENT
Nor could the direction of deceased's travel be
determined by speculating as to the time Tuttle left
Springville. Before the case was tried, plaintiffs had
the benefit, through deposition and interrogatories, of
the approximate time of the accident as registered
by the truck tachometer, 8 :36 P.M. If Tuttle left
Springville at around 8 :30 as testified to by Mrs.
Tuttle, of course, it is possible he might have reached
the scene of the accident on his way to Provo. However, clocks and watches are not all accurately set as
to time nor do they always keep or record accurate
time: Certainly, this bit of SELF-SERVING TESTIMONY is insufficient to fix or determine or prove
the direction of travel a.t the scene of the accident as
against the testimony of disinterested eye witnesses
who observed to the contrary.
No one was expecting the accident to occur and
others, though close friends and relatives, did not
claim to know the exact time. Mrs. Tuttle and her
mother, Mrs. Jensen, were expecting to attend an
M-Men basketball game in Springville. The first game
commenced at 7:00 P.M. (T-154, 178). They were in22
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tending to see the second game commencing when the
first ended, presumably at 8:00 P.M. (T-154), while
they said the game in which they were interested had
started \Yhen they arriYed (T-180-1), they did not say
ho\Y long it had been going. While it wa.s mentioned
that Tnttle "~as going to howl (T-153), no one knew
anything about the details as to the bowling arrangements. Tuttle hadn't bo,vled before and no one was
able to give names of any of the fellows with whom
he intended to bow·l nor the place or location thereof.
It \vas a Saturday night (T-161-62). They were just
figuring on forming a league (T-181). What was actually in Tuttle's mind and just where he went or
intended to go or do could only be a matter of speculation.
RESPONDENTS' AUTH·ORITIES
The authorities relied upon by respondents were
decided upon the basis of the particular facts ~and
circumstances existing in those cases. The legal rules
and principles therein discussed should, of course, be
judiciously and not abstractly applied, having due
regard first and foremost to the end that the case
should be decided upon the basis of fact as distinguished from speculation or inference based upon
inference. Probative facts from which the casual relation is proven or reasonably inferred must be established to satisfy the burden of proof. Mere speculation should not be allowed to serve the duty of probative facts.
There is a very fundament·al and distinguishing
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difference in the cases recited by the respondents from
the instant case in that in the instant case there were
disinterested as well as interested witnesses in the
immediate vicinity of the accident who observed and
saw the accident occur, which evidence is corroborated
by the physical evidence.

Perrin v. Union Pac. R. R. Co.; 59 Utah 1, 201
P 405, page 15 respondents' brief, was an action
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
There were no eye witnesses to establish deceased's contributory negligence as in the instant case. lTnder the
circumstances, it was held that plaintiff was entitled
to the benefit of the rule given in the court's instruction that "there is a presumption that the deceased,
A.C.P., used due care in and about his work." The court
then pointed out that assuming plajntiff 'vas in the
exercise of due care, then there was evidence the accident could not have occurred except for the negligence of the defendant. While indulging in the presumption, ho,vever, the court made it clear that had
there been eye witnesses as to ho'v the accident occurred, plaintiff would not have been entitled to the
in~truction given. Said the Court:
''The instruction is applicable only in the
absence of evidence as to just how the accident
happened. There was no eyewitnesses. It is only
in such cases that litigants are entitled to this or
a like instruction. ''
Under the court's instructions in the instant case,
we have pointed out the error and misleading manner
24
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in 'Yhich the court permitted the jury to indulge in
such a presun1ption.
C'oray r. Ogden Union Ry. and Depot Company,
111 Utah 5-!1, 180 P (2) 542, page 15 of respondents'
brief, is like,Yise brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability . .-\.ct.
.
Here again there were no eye witnesses
who observed how the accident occurred and the presumption of due care on the part of deceased is only
presumed by reason of the lack of such evidence.
Gagos v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 101,
48 P (2) 449, page 15 respondents' brief, was an industrial case involving a hernia. Claimant was the
sole \Yitness and there \Vere no disinterested witnesses
as to the fact in issue.

The general rules quoted from Jensen v. Logan
City, 96 Utah 522,_ 88 P(2) 459; Hearstrich v. Oregon
Short Line R. R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 P 100; and
Leavitt v. Thu.rston, 38 Utah 351, 113 P 77; pages 15
and 16 _respectively·, respondents' brief, should logically be invoked in favor of the contentions of appellants, because the testimony of all eye witnesses, corroborated by the physical· facts, should not be disregarded, especially when plaintiffs' theory is based
upon supposition and purely negative testimony.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED
Defendants' motion for ~ directed verdict (T-4·54)
was based essentially upon.\ the fact that all of the
probative evidence showed that deceased's own negli-
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gence was. a proximate cause of the collision and plaintiffs failed to affirmatively prove any facts constituting a cause of action, and any verdict in favor of
plaintiffs would necessarily rest upon speculation and
conjecture. Such motion, made at the conclusion of all
of the evidence, was renewed on all grounds at the
time of filing defendants' motion for a new trial
(T-254) filed May 25, 1950.
When there are disinterested eye witnesses who
saw how the accident occurred and when there are
physical facts corroborating such eye witnesses -and
when plaintiffs have failed to prove any affirmative
facts giving rise to a cause of action, a verdict should
be directed in favor of the defendants. There is then
no reason to speculate that one of the cars was going
in the opposite direction to which it was seen to have
been going and further add inference upon inference
to build an imaginary accident. Such negative evidence is not sufficient to p-rove affirmative £acts as
against the undisputed testimony of disinterested ·witnesses corroborated by physical facts.
East Grouse Creek Wa.ter Co. v. Frost, 66
Utah 587, 245 P 338.
Anderson v. Union Pac. R'. ~Co., 76 Utah 324,
289 p 146.
We respectfully submit that defendants' motion
for a directed verdict should have been sustained.
ERRONEOUS AND MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS
Plaintiffs here .admit that if the accident occurred
as all of the eye witnesses say it did when the Tuttle
26
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ear turned left in front of the truck, then there should
be no reroYery hera use deceased's own negligence
·would of necessity be the proximate cause of the collision.
T1 err ill v. Harrington (Me.), 163 Atl. 266.

Probst v. Smith Hardware Co. (La.) 141 So.
508.
Youngv.Cerrato (Cal) 37P (2) 1063
Litherbury v. Kimmet (Cal.) 195 P 660
Madron v. McCoy, et al (Idaho) 126 P(2) 566
Dudley v. Surles (La.) 11 So. 2nd 70
Cederlof v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P(2)
777
(See pages 34..:38 of our original brief)
However, in the court below, counsel did not proceed on the theory that the direction of travel WAS
THE SOLE AND ONLY ISSUE, but rather submitted forty-four requested instructions (see transcript 149-196) consisting almost entirely of ABSTRACT PROPOSITIONS OF LAW seeking to recover on ANY ONE OF THE NUMEROUS ALLEGED GROUNDS OF NEGLIGENCE, in nearly
all instances without regard to the direction of travel
and without any application to the facts and circumstances of the case. Many of these requested instructions were adopted by the court verbatim as requested
simply in the abstract. They were calculated .and
directed to mislead, confuse and prejudice the JUry,
and defendants were effectively denied a· fair trial.
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JURY DID· NOT DETERMINE TUTTLE CAR
WAS TRAVELING NORTH
The trial court below did not leave it to the
jury to simply determine which direction the Tuttle
car was travelling. Had respondent at the pretrial
limited this to the sole issue and consequently had
the trial court done so, and had this simple issue
alone been submitted to the jury as the sole determining factor without mingling and submitting all abstract allegations of negligence, a verdict in favor of
defendants . would undoubtedly have been the result.
No request 'vas made by plaintiffs for a special
interrogatory or verdict determining the direction of
travel of the Tuttle car. The jury, confused by the
muddle of abstractions and confused notions of counsel, did not so find. Respondents here for the first
time take the position that there was only one question,
namely the direction in which the Tuttle car was travelling. If. so, that issue only should have been submitted and the utter confusion avoided.
Nor, did the court proceed upon the theory that
deceased was as a matter of law free from contributory negligence if the jury found he, Tuttle, was travelling north.
Plaintiffs by their requested instructions Nos. 11,
12 and 13 (T-159-61) also 17 (T-166) requested that
the jury be instructed that deceased, Tuttle, was free
from negligence or contributory negligence as a matter of law if he was travelling north. In denying these
28
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reqnt>sts and in denying defendants' motion for a directed verdict on all grounds argued on the several
grounds stated nt the close of all the evidence (Tr ..
45±), the trial court took the position that the issue
of contributory negligence 'Yas one for the jury, whicheYer direction deceased 'Yas travelling.
\\:hile the trial court did instruct the jury that
plaintiffs clai1ned Tuttle 'Yas driving north, defendants, on the other hand, claimed he was driving south.
That is as far as the matter went, and it was never
determined by the court nor vvas the jury instructed
that the direction of travel was the SOLE ISSUE and
the question of deceased's contributory negligence was
left to the jury in either instail.ce. By instruction No.
3 ( T -2:23), the court instructed the jury to return a
verdict for plaintiffs if Tuttle was driving north, provided further :
''If you further find from the evidence that
the said Dale Tuttle exercised reasonable care for
his own . safety and was not himself guilty of
negligence contributing to his death." (T-223)
As a counterpart, the court by its instruction No. 4
(T-224), in substance instructed the jury that plaintiffs could not recover if Tuttle was driving south.
provided it further found:
''That the deceased, Dale Tuttle1 was negligent
in suddenly turning in front of defendants' truck
and that such negligence proximately caused or
proximately contributed to cause the collision.''
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DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF THE
EVIDENCE DENIED
I-Iaving left all issues for the jury to determine
and to assure each party a fair and impartial trial,
it was incumbent upon the trial court to submit the
respective theories of each party, not merely as an
ABSTRACT PROPOSITION, but as applied to the
particular facts of the case.
The lower court in substantially adopting plaintiffs' requests, though specific and repeated exceptions
were duly taken by appellant, nowhere instructed the
jury respecting the specific legal duties, statutory or
otherwise, as they applied to contributory negligence;
that is as they applied to Tuttle's conduct under the
facts and circumstances of the case. In other words,
the whole matter of contributory negligence, whatever view the jury took of the evidence and whichever the direction of Tuttle's travel, was left in the
abstract. The jury was left without any guidance or
help from the court so they could properly apply the
law. This, tied in with respondents' numerous and
repetitious allegations of negligence and abstract instructions, enabled counsel for the respondents to completely confuse, mislead and prejudice the jury.
Respondents' procedure of injecting numerous allegations of negligence and an unreasonable number
of purely abstract instructions not only effectively confused the jury but was undoubtedly an influencin~
factor in causing the trial court to adopt respondents'
requests, effectively resulting in a denial of practically
30
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all of defendants' requested instructions bearing upon
the negligence of deeea.sed, defining his duties and
obligations as such related to the traffic and conditions existing upon the high,Yay. We fail to appreciate the justice in such procedure.
Because of the confused state of the record and
the likelihood of the jury misunderstanding the application of lR\Y under the particular circumstances, the
language of this court in Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah
151, 140 P(2) 7'72, quoted at the top of page 57 of
our original brief, is especially pertinent. There it
is clearly pointed out that each party is entitled to
have his case submitted to the jury on any theory
justified by proper evidence, and the giving of general instructions is condemned. ·
Defendants' requested instructions Nos. 5 {T-202),
8 (T-205), 9 (T-206), 10 (T-207) and 11 {T208) discussed page 54-60 our original brief, related to the law
of contributory negligence and correctly defined certain statutory and common law duties of the deceased,
Tuttle, in relation to other traffic. In failing to give
any of such requests or similar instructions, the defendants were denied a substantial right, the right
to have the jury instructed on defendants' theory of
the case.
Without the benefit of these or similar instructions,
the jury was so confused with the numerous repeated
allegations and abstract ins~ructions that they h:a.d no
idea as to 'vhat laws were involved or how they should
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be applied concerning the rights and correlative duties
of the respective parties or the law of the particular
case as applied to particular facts and circumstances.
PROCEDURE AND ERRORS CALCULATED
TO DO HARM
Res·pondents, while acknowledging that there were
errors in the court's instructions and that they were
given essentially in the abstract, argue, however, that
such errors were not prejudicial within the rule stated
in Jensen v. Utah Ry. Company, 72 Utah 366, 270 P
349, quoted page 32 respondents' brief, as follows:
''We think the better rule is that not all committed errors in the trial of a case are presumptively or prima facie prejudicial for some committed errors are merely abstract, or on their
face immaterial or otherwise are not in and of
themselves calculated to do harm.''
However, counsel omitted the rest of the language
of the court which continuing reads:
"However where the committed error is of
such nature or character as calculated to do harm,
or on its face as having the natural tendency to
do so, prejudice will be presumed, until by the
record it is affirmatively shown that the er.ror
was not or could not have been of harmful effect.
Thus, if the appellant shows committed· error of
such nature or character, he, in the first instance,
has made a prima facie showing of prejudice.
The burden, or rather the duty of going forward,
is then cast on the respondent to show by the
record that the committed error w·a.s not, or could
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not have been, of harmful effect. State v. Cluff,
48 lT tah 102, 158 P 701; Jackson, Stone, et al v.
Feather River & Gibsonville Water Co., 14 Cal.
19; Thelin Y. Stewart, 100 Cal. 372, 34 861 ; 2
Hayne, Ne'Y Trial and Appeal (2d Ed.) pp.
1608-1614. ''
To the same effect, see Clark v. Los Angeles and
S.L.R. Co., 73 lTtah 486, 275 P 582, at p~age 502 of the
Utah Report.
PROCEDURE

CALClTI~_A_TED

TO PREJUDICE

The procedure pursued by counsel for respondents
and its influencing effect upon the manner in which
the court below instructed the jury, shows a deliberate
plan and purpose to confuse and which was well calculated to do harm, and in ·fact did have a natural
tendency to do so. Flagrant ~rrors in the court's instructions, induced through counsel's procedure which
placed greater duties on defendants than the law requires, are further proof that they were calculated to
do harm.
We have called attention to the fact that matters
relating to the control and speed were unreasonably
repeated in plaintiffs' complaint, there being at least
five sub-paragraphs, (a), (b), (e), (h), and (j), which
were duplicitas in the extreme and were repeated verbatim in the court's instruction No. 1 (T-219-21). That
the palpable and flagrant errors committed in the
court's instruction No. 15 were intentionally done at
the insistence of respondents is evident when reference is made to plaintiffs requested instructions Nos.
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22 (T~l71), 28 (T-178) and 29 (T-179), all of which
related to precisely the same matters and all of which
INCORRECTLY QUOTED THE STATUTE, Section
57-7-113, U.C.A. 1943, by requiring:_ such speed as to
prevent ''COLLIDING WITH ANY PERSON, VEHICLE OR CONVEYANCE ON OR ENTERING
THE HIGHWAY." The court's instruction No. 15
was apparently taken verbatim from plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 29.
Instructing the jury in such manner was especially unfair to defendants when the court entirely rejected defendants' requested instructions Nos. 16 and
17 ( T -213-4). These requests, discussed pages 49 and
50 our original brief, or similar qualifying instructions,
would have at least limited the jury to claims of negligence based upon ''speed'' or ''being over the center
line of the highway'' to circumstances where such
might reasonably found to be A PROXIl\IATE CAUSE
OF THE COLLISION. In other words, there was no
application of the abstract instructions given as to the
particular facts and circumstances, and counsel for
respondents was permitted to confuse and mislead the
jury as to proximate cause and to cause them to believe that if defendants' truck could not under the circumstances avoid a collision or if defendants' driver
was going. one mile per hour over the regulated speed
limit or the left wheels of defendants' truck were any
degree over the center line, then defendants were liable.
These matters were emphasized beyond all reason,
HAVING BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE CASE AT
34
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THE CONTINUED INSISTENCE OF COUNSEL
FOR RESPONDENTS BY HIS NUMEROUS AND
REPETITIOUS ALLEGATIONS AND REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIO~S AND WERE CLEARLY CALCUL_._\TED TO INFLUENCE AND MISLEAD THE
JlTRY. Clearly, a greater duty was placed upon the
defendants than required under the statute.
The harm in giving such instructions (primarily
relating to speed) is further evident in the fact that
such instructions could only be applied and effectually
argued as against the defendants. There was no claim
of speed on the part of the deceased, Tuttle, he having
made an improper turn. (See defendants' ansvver T-23-4) Such instructions were calculated to harm
defendants and were effectively used with undue emphasis on matters not shown to have been a proximate.
or actual cause of the collision.
ERROR CALCULATED TO PREJUDICE
The court's instruction No. 15 was particularly
vicious in that it left out the important and qualifying
portions of the statute, Section 57-7-113, and required
defendants' driver unqualifiedly to drive at such speed
that he could ''AVOID COLLIDING WITH ANY
PERSON, VEHICLE OR OTHER CONVEYANCE
ON OR ENTERING THE HIGHWAY.' This clearly
cast upon defendants a duty that is greater than is
required not only under the statute but und~r rule of
law generally.
In Knutson v. Luri, (Iowa) 251 N.W. 147, an
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instruction much like that in the instant case was held
to erroneously define the duty of defendant and was
reversible error. The instruction first stated in general
terms that it was the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary care, but added that if there was danger
of collision, ''it is his duty to reduce the speed of his
car so * * * he can bring his vehicle to a stop and
avoid injury.'' The court s·aid that this instruction
was erroneous because it required her to avoid injury
''whether a reasonable prudent person could do so or
not. * * * Obviously the instruction, even when read
with the remainder of the court's charge was prejudicial.''
In Loony v. Parker (Iowa) 230 N.W. 570, an instruction requiring the defendant ''to maintain such
control of his car as to enable him to stop without hitting the car ahead of him'' was erroneous as requiring the driver to exercise such control as to ''avoid
collision whether he was negligent or not.''
In Gregory v. Suhr (Iowa) 268 N.W. 14, a new
trial was properly g:r.anted where an instruction had
been given which tended to impose upon the defendant the absolute duty of having his automobile under
such control as to avoid a collision. See also Fry v.
Smith, (Iowa) 253 N.W. 147.
In Boutelle v. White (Ga.) 149 S.E. 805, an instruction among other things requiring defendant to
exercise ' 'the degree of diligence * * * necessary to
avoid injuring others'' was properly refused as imposing the duty of an insurer. And in Giles v. 17 oiles
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(Ga.} S~ ~.E. ~07, the giYing of an instruction containing the ~nlnP language as in the Boutelle case 'vas held
:·eyersible Prror, the court saying:
-·This iinposed on defendant the duty of obserYing the diligence required of ~an insurer and
eliminated all such questions as accident, contributory negligence, and the duty of plaintiff
to exereise ordinar~~ rare to avoid the consequences of defendant's negligence."
In Grandha.gen r. Grnndhagen (Wis.) 225 N.W.
935, it 'Yas reYersible error to instruct the jury "that
it i=' tl1e ~lut:· nf e\·._.ry clri,·pr nf a rnotor ear upon
tht-> high\\·a~- tu kePp hi:' auturuubile at al1 times under
L:uutrul. and ir he fail~ to have his car under control he
is guilty of 'Yant of ordinary care." The court said
that this ''imposed an undue burden upon the defendandt. The duty of Oscar Grandhagen was to exercise
ordinary care to keep his automobile under control.
The instruction imposed the absolute duty to keep the
automobile under control at all times, regardless of
the question of whether ordinary care was exercised in
so doing."
See also Saltas v. Affleck, -99 Utah .381, 105 P(2)
176, discussed page 47 our original brief.
The court's instruction No. 14 (T-234), set forth
page 46 of appellants' original brief, was similarly
calculated to cause the jury to believe that defendant
\vas required to ''avoid a collision with another vehicle
or person upon the highway reasonably ·within the
range of his vision.''
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While the court did modify respondents' original
requested instruction No. 28 by requiring defendant
to take such measures as are "reasonable'', it still in
substance and effect led the jury to believe that under
the law defendant was required absolutely to avoid a
collision. The clear and palpable error in the court's
instruction No. 15 was thereby re-emphasized.
It cannot be claimed that other instructions cured
the error because conflicting instructions, or instructions which are misleading or have a natural tendency
to mislead, are presumed to have had an influencing
effect upon the jury.
Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 261, 170 P. 72;
State v. Green, (Utah) 6 P. (2d) 177;
Martin v. ·sheffield, (Utah) 189 P. (2d) 127;
Saltas v. Affleck, supr·a.
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 13
The court's instruction No. 13 ( T -233) given verba tim fron1 respondents' reuested instruction No. 27
(T-176) also viciously imposed upon the defendants'
driver a duty far greater than the la\v requires. It
was \Veil calculated to injure defendants and arouse
prejudice in the minds of the jury. It arbitrarily required that defendant be extraordinarily alert "BY
C,ONSTANTLY keeping A LOOKOUT NOT ONLY
AHEAD BUT TO THE SIDES OF HIS VEHICLE.''
Yet, there was not even any evidence that defendants'
driver failed to keep a lookout. He at all times s;aw
the Tutle car and was observing the highway ahead
of him. Even if there had been evidence as to lack
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of lookout, still the instruction 'vas erroneous and prejudicial in requiring a greater lookout than the law
imposed. The instruction also brought in facts not even
inYolYed in the case, such as intersections. It IMPOSED LI.J..L\.BILITY upon defendant if he did not
"CONST.A.NTLY KEEP A LOOKOUT NOT ONLY
~L\HE.:\.D B1JT TO THE SIDES OF HIS VEHICLE".
It 'vas qualified only by the limitation of contributory
negligence stated in general terms not adequately covered in other fustructions.

ERROR IN SUBniiTTING ALL ALLEGATIONS
· Certainly the large number of respondents' reuested instructions 'vas an influencing factor in causing the court to give its instruction No. 1 ( T -219-2~)
covering all of the naked allegations vvithout regard
to supporting evidence or proximate cause. .In this
respect we note that requests numbered 2 (T-151), 3
(T-154), 8 (T-157) 16 (T-165) and 33 (T-183) all called
for a submission of each and every allegation of negligence, which were themselves duplitious and in no wise
connected up with the proximate cause of the collision.
OVER-EJVIPHASIS AS TO DEFENDANTS'
SPEED, ETC.
Respondents especially made it a point from the
beginning to place such undue emphasis upon speed,
control, presumptions, circumstantial evidence and
other vague and abstract principles clearly calculated
to confuse. In ddition to his requested instructions
numbered 11, 12 and 13 relating to speed and control,
39
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

requests numbered 20 (T-169), 22 (T-171), 23 (T-172),
24 (T-173), 29 (T-179) and 37 (T-187) related to similar matter.
LIGHTS
There was no evidence that the lights on defendants' truck were blinding or that flashing lights on and
off interfered with the vision of deceased, as alleged
in paragraph (k) incorporated in the court's instruction No. 1 ( T -219-21). True, the driver flashed his
lights from low to high beam and back to low beam
again ( T -2.61) as a signal to the cars :ahead of him
which he was passing ox intending to pass and which
were travelling in the same direction in the righthand
lane of traffic. Such practice is such a well-established
one, used designedly for the purpose of signalling an
intention to pass, that it is not necessary to convince
this court of such practice. There is no evidence, however, and it would be pure speculation to assume, that
such lights interfered with the vision of deceased, or to
assume from the mere fact that he did blink his lights
that deceased was blinded or that such had any casual
connection with the collision. Clearly respondents injected this matter, as they did the other numerous
allegations, for the purpose of misleading the jury and
causing them to feel prejudiced against defendants.
By making this and building up other hypothetical
contentions they piled inference upon inference to
utter confusion.

ERROR AS TO PRESUMPTION
We pointed out, page 51 of our original brief,
40
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that the court's instruction No. 6 (T-226) in effect
permitted the jury to assume that deceased was presnnled to be in the exerrise of reasonable care. Such
rule, ho,Yever, has no application where there is proof
to the contrary: in this instance clearly rebutted by
disinterested eye-\Yitnesses corroborated by the phyiscal
facts. Perrin L'. Union Pacific R. R. ,Co., 59 Utah 1,
201 P. 405, supra. See, also, Saltas v. Affleck, In Re
rl ewell's Estate and other authorities cited at page 40
of appellants' original brief.
Here, again, the matter of presumption was
asked for by at least three of plaintiffs' requests,
namely, Nos. 5 (T-154), 12 (T-161) and 13 (T-162).
On the other hand defendants' requested instruction
No. 19 (T-216), \Yhich would have correctly instructed
the jury on the matter, 'vas refused over defendants'
specific exceptions.

OVER-EMPHASIS AS. TO INFERENCES
AND PRESUMPTIONS
The court's instruction No. 9 ( T -229), added to
the numerous other abstract and misleading instructions, permitted the jury to think that they could
judge the case on general principles without application of particular laws and particular circumstances.
This, again, caused the jury to lose sight of :a.nd completely disregard the matter of proximate caus~. This
type of instruction was induced by respondents' reuested instructions numbered 14 (T-163), 34 (T-184)
and 35 (T-185). We ask, how could the numerous and
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irrelevant allegations and abstract instructions help
but influence and mislead the jury~

SUDDEN EMERGENCY MISAPPLIED
As a result of plaintiffs' requested instructions
numbered 6 (T-154) and 18 (T-167) the court gave an
abstract instruction relating to sudden emergency (see
the court's instruction 22 (T-243). This was especially
harmful when counsel for respondents over-emphasized such rna tters as speed, control and driving over
the center line, when in fact there was no proof that
the same or other repetitious rna tters had anything to
do with the proximate cause of the collision. There
was no evidence that Tuttle was faced with an emergency. The evidence is he created one.
Except for the undue length of this brief we should
point out other numerous and abstract instructions
which tended to mislead and confuse the jury.
INSURANCE INDEMNIFICATION
When counsel for respondents throughout the
trial had made continued reference to Kunz and Platt
(the mysterious investigators) and continually referred to various statements taken, it was unnecessary
for Carol Ellis to volunteer ''the insurance adjuster''
even though the first reference thereto was in response to a question asked by the defense. She could
have referred to ''Kunz" or even "the investigator".
Certainly, it was not necessary for her to later, when
questioned by plaintiffs' counsel, to again bring in
42
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the matter by Ynlunteering the statement "he said
he '\Yas from the
INSURANCE COMPANY''.
Through rautioning ~liss Ellis, a regular client of
counsel for respondents, counsel could easily have
aYoided such reference.
CONCLUSION
For lack of eYidence, it appears counsel for respondents from the outset substituted multiple allegations of negligent and llll_merous and duplicitas abstract
instructions of la \Y calcnla ted to mislead and confuse
the jury. Such procedure, coupled with wholly negative testimony produced through friendly witnesses
naturally sympathetic to deceased's family, should not
in justice be substituted for proven facts based upon
the unbiased testimony of disinterested eye witnesses
corroborated by tangible physical facts.
Respondents suggestion that the case has been
twice tried is a further play upon the sympathy of
this court, while the record on the other hand shows
a determined effort from the beginning on the part of
respondents to confuse, mislead and prejudice the jury,
as a result of which a verdict was finally obtained.
We respectfully submit that such verdict should be
set aside, the judgment reversed and an order made
directing judgment for the defendant in accordance
with the facts of the accident.
If for any reason this court does not agree, although we feel certain it will, then that a new trial be
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ordered with proper issues and instructions so de- . .
fined as to assure a fair trial.
Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON,
E. F. BALDWIN, JR.

Attorneys for Pefendants
and AppellcvntJs.
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